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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
LEGISLATION-THE NEW YORK CONSERVATOR LAW
Recently enacted provisions of the New York Mental Hy-
giene Law1 provide for the appointment of a fiduciary, termed a "con-
servator," for anyone "who by reason of advanced age, illness, infirmity,
mental weakness, intemperance, addiction to drugs, or other cause,
has suffered substantial impairment of his ability to care for his prop-
erty .... ,,2 The present article will discuss the statute, define the prob-
lems that existed prior to passage of the new law, and analyze the likely
effect that the law will have in solving these problems.
I. THE STATUTE: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 77 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, entitled "Con-
servators," is intended to provide a flexible means to protect persons
with certain debilities.3 Basically, the statute enables county courts
outside of New York City and state supreme courts to appoint a con-
servator for any person who has become unable to care for his property,
or to provide for himself or others dependent upon him.4 The court
proceeding can be initiated by the proposed conservatee, a friend or
relative, or, if the proposed conservatee is a patient in a mental hospital
or institution, by the official in charge of the institution.5 Before the
court can appoint a conservator, it must be satisfied that there is clear
and convincing proof of the need for one.6 Any party has the right to
request a jury trial as to an issue of fact concerning the need for a
1. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 77 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (effective Jan. 1,
1973).
2. Id. § 77.01. The scope of this legislative note is restricted to the impact of
the statute with respect to elderly people. The possible effect on individuals with other
types of debilities is not discussed; however, in a three-year study (1960-1962) of a
similar District of Columbia statute (D.C. CODE § 21-1301 (1967)) providing for the
appointment of a "committee" for persons unfit to manage or control their property
because of "habitual use of intoxicating liquors, opium, cocaine, or any similar sub-
stance . . . ," no reported cases were found where this section of the law was used.
Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District of Columbia, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 243,
250-51 (1963).
3. Legislative Memoranda, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1972, at 3290.
4. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 77.01 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
5. Id. § 77.03(a).
6. Id. § 77.01.
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conservator.7 However, failure to request a jury waives the right.8 A
guardian ad litem may be appointed by the court to protect the interests
of the proposed conservatee at the trial.9
The proposed conservatee can nominate a preferred conservator,
but the court has discretion to reject this suggestion and select another
person, in what it deems to be the best interests of the conservatee. 10
The appointed conservator gains actual control over the real and per-
sonal property of the ward with a duty to use this property for the sup-
port of the latter and any of his legal dependents." The exact powers of
management are flexible, and the court has discretion to allocate them
to fit the conservatee's condition. 2 Although the conservatee loses
control over his property, the statute stipulates that he may not be de-
prived of any civil right solely because of the appointment of a con-
servator.13
When petitioned by any interested person, including the ward,
the court must reexamine the situation to determine if the ward has
recovered sufficiently to be able to care for his property himself.1 4 If
requested by any party to such proceeding, the ability of the conserva-
tee to care for his property will be determined by a jury trial.'r
II. PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE
In recent years there has been a growing concern over the state
of the law relating to persons unable to manage their own affairs be-
cause of advanced age. The New York statute recognizes the fact that
the subject of fiduciary protection for the aged is becoming increasingly
important since, due to the increase in average life expectancy in the
United States, the percentage of older persons in the general popula-
tion has increased. 16 Furthermore, with the widespread advent of pen-
7. Id. § 77.07(c).
8. Id.
9. Id. §§ 77.07(b), 77.09.
10. Id. § 77.03(c).
11. Id. § 77.21.
12. Id. § 77.19. It should be noted that in contrast to similar laws in some other
states, the New York law does not give a conservator powers over the person of the
conservatee. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1851 (West Supp. 1972); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 3, § 121 (1961).
13. N.Y. MENTAL HYomNE LAw § 77.25(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
14. Id. § 77.35.
15. Id.
16. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, THE NATION AND ITS OLDER PEOPLE
117 (1961).
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sion plans (public and private) and public assistance, these senior
citizens now have more funds.
17
The New York statute was designed to deal with certain weak-
nesses in existing incompetency laws.' 8 First, individuals were re-
luctant to initiate incompetency proceedings because of the stigma as-
sociated with such a finding. Complications also arose when the im-
paired person was merely semi-incompetent.19 Further, the incompe-
tency law attempted to fit a physical and mental impairment which is
not sharply defined into an "either-or" legal format.
2 0
A. Inadequacies of the Incompetency Law
A field study was recently instituted in New York's Onondaga and
Tompkins Counties to ascertain how the incompetency law has been
administered.2' The results of the study show that many of the safe-
guards in the law were insufficient.22 Under the incompetency statute,
the test for the appointment of the surrogate manager, termed a "com-
mittee," is that the proposed incompetent be "unable" to conduct his
personal or business affairs.23 The study found that in practice label-
ling replaces legal analysis, and that the real decision maker is the
examining physician.2 4 None of the court transcripts examined revealed
any attempt by the physician to detail how the impaired person's med-
ical condition affected his capacity to manage his estate.2 5 Thus, it
17. G. MATHIASEN, GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE
25 (1963).
18. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW -§ 78 (McKinney Supp. 1972). The incompetency
section was revised and renumbered along with the rest of the mental hygiene law during
the 1972 legislative session. Basically, the only substantial changes pertained to the proce-
dures relative to a patient of a state institution. The old version of this part of the statute
can be found in N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 550.
19. McAvinckey, The Not-Qouite-Incompetent Incompetent, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES
872 (1956).
20. Legislative Memoranda, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1972, at 3290; N.Y. LAW REVISION
CoMm. REP., at 219 (1967).
21. G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE
MANAGEMENT (1972) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER].
22. Id. at 137.
23. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 78.01 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
24. ALEXANDER 23.
25. Id. at 24. The study of incompetency in the District of Columbia revealed
confusion among members of the medical profesion about the nature of the incompetency
proceedings. Zenoff, supra note 2, at 255. See generally Leifer, The Competence of
the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetence-A Skeptical Inquiry
into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 564 (1963).
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seems that the courts seldom attempt to apply the statutory test of
whether economic value judgment is affected.
26
At the incompetency proceeding, the alleged incompent is given
the assistance of a guardian ad litem who is an attorney.27 The field
study revealed that in practice the guardian ad litem tends not to view
himself as an advocate of the alleged incompetent, but rather as an im-
partial agent of the court.28 Thus, the viability of the advocacy which
the alleged incompetent receives at the trial seems questionable.
When a "committee" is appointed for the incompetent, his ac-
tions are subject to the control of the court. To insure that the com-
mittee complies with the court's orders, an annual accounting must be
filed.2 9 However, the field study concluded that adequate judicial su-
pervision is hampered since, out of 419 estate files examined, less than
19% of the committees had fully complied with the accounting re-
quirements. ° Furthermore, nearly 40% had never filed any reports.3 '
In no case did the court take any action to compel compliance. 82 The
field study further revealed that committees did not bother to consult
with the incompetent before making major decisions.3 In fact, most
attorney-committees for hospitalized wards never even met the pa-
tient.34 Relatives appointed as committees usually visited their wards,
but there was no indication that financial matters were discussed.",
The fact that a relative, rather than an attorney, has been entrusted
with managerial powers over the ward's property, does not necessarily
foster preservation of the ward's financial interests.
An additional problem has developed in New York regarding
the manner in which the incompetency law has been used with re-
spect to patients in state mental hospitals. In New York, the patient,
his estate, and his spouse are jointly and severally liable for the costs
of medical care in a state institution.38 However, the incompetency
26. ALEXANDER 23.
27. N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAw § 1201 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.Y. SURR. CT. Pao.
LAw § 404(1) (McKinney 1967).
28. ALEXANDER 104. The study in the District of Columbia also found that the
guardian ad litem was a neutral factfinder for the court rather than an attorney to
represent the ward. Zenoff, supra note 2, at 252.




33. Id. at 114-23.
34. Id. at 114.
35. Id. at 122.
36. N.Y. MENTAL HYGmNE LAW § 43.03(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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statute has provided a shortcut to traditional- creditor remedies to col-
lect costs of medical care.37 This result is achieved through the inter:
play of the commitment and incompetency provisions. The mental hos-
pital cannot initiate incompetency proceedings against a patient who
is voluntarily admitted.38 However, if a voluntary patient who is in-
debted to the institution is discovered to have substantial funds, the hos-
pital can (and does) initiate steps to change the patient's status to "in-
voluntary." 39 This is accomplished by a certificate of examination from
two physicians accompanied by an application for involuntary admis-
sion from an interested person (who can be the hospital's director) .40
Once the patient has become an involuntary admission, the state hos-
pital can initiate an incompetency proceeding to create a committee,
who is thereby obligated to pay the patient's debts.41 The incompetency
proceeding for an involuntary admission is thus different from a normal
incompetency action; it is summary, with no need for an adjudication,
by a judge or jury, of actual incompetency.42 A special committee of
the New York City Bar Association 8 has stated:
The director of the hospital, represented by the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the case, may present a petition to the court al-
leging that the patient has been duly certified and that he is still in the
hospital. The statute indicates no need for more evidence of incompe-
tency than that which may be provided by proof of these allegations.
The court may even dispense with notice to the patient if "sufficient
reasons" for doing so are alleged. The court, acting without a jury,
is then required to determine whether the allegations are true and, if
they are, may proceed immediately to appoint a committee.44  i,
37. Lewin, The Laws for the Aged: A Study in Discrimination, 23 SY.ACUSE L.
REv. 68, 69 (1972).
38. ALEXANDER 68.
39. Lewin, supra note 37, at 70.
40. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 31.17(b), 31.27 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
41. N.Y. Sess. Laws-1966, ch. 550, as amended N.Y. MENTAL HYOTENE LAW
§ 78.07 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
42. Id.
43. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF TEE AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK WITH CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS (1962)
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMMITTEE].
44. Id. at 202. It should be noted that the section dealing with the appoihtmeit
ot a committee for a patient in a state facility was changed during the 1972 session of
the legislature. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1972, ch. 251, amending N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENELAw
§ 102 (McKinney 1971). The petition must now be verified and state facts showing
that the patient is unable to adequately conduct his personal or business affairs. A tight
to a trial by jury on the issue of the patient's ability to conduct personal or buiiness
affairs is also provided. At this point it is unclear whether these changes will in fact
alter the summary nature of proceedings for patients in state institutions.
49I-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Thus, the decision to initiate an incompetency proceeding in this situa-
tion can be purely administrative, based upon the financial criteria of
whether the patient owes the hospital money and is found to own
sufficient assets to cover the debt. The legal tests for involuntary com-
mitment and for incompetency seem to be irrelevant to the adminis-
trative decision-making process. 45
Families of patients in a state facility have preferred to use the
simpler procedure for an involuntary admission 40 rather than the nor-
mal procedures for declaration of incompetency.47 It is conceivable
that the family of a person not yet in a state hospital could have him
certified and placed in an institution solely to take advantage of the
less onerous procedure for patients of a state facility.
48
B. Existing Alternatives to Incompetency Proceedings and Their
Practical Limitations
In addition to the new conservator statute, there are several alterna-
tives to incompetency proceedings to protect impaired individuals, in-
cluding: (1) power of attorney; (2) joint tenancy; and (3) inter vivos
trust. Creation of the power of attorney is the most common. 4 How-
ever, it suffers from the serious limitation of being terminated by the
principal's incapacity to contract; "the loss of capacity by the principal
has the same effect upon the authority of the agent during the period
of incapacity as has the principal's death."' 0 Even where the individual
is not fully incompetent, there would be a problem, because the agent
would be acting at his peril if the principal were to become legally
incompetent."'
Joint tenancy is a common device for use within the family
group. 2 It is inexpensive and provides temporary protection against
the contingency that one of the parties will lose his ability to manage
45. An additional injustice in this procedure is that while the hospital treats the
switch from voluntary to involuntary status as a routine matter, there are substantial differ-
ences in the patient's rights between the two classifications. For a discussion of this
issue, see ALEXANDER 69.
46. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 550, as amended N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §
78.07 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
47. SPECIAL CoMMTarTEE 212.
48. Id.
49. Zillgitt, Planning for Incompetency and Possibilities and Practices Under the
Conservatorship Law, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 181, 182 (1964).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AoENcY § 122(1) (1958).
51. Zillgitt, supra note 49, at 182.
52. Id.
LEGISLATIVE NOTE
property.5 3 A joint tenancy's basic limitation is that it becomes uneco-
nomical for estate tax reasons if the value of the property is substan-
tial.54 Furthermore, if both husband and wife are quite old, a joint
tenancy arrangement is not satisfactory, since in time neither the couple
nor the survivor will be able to manage his affairs.55
An inter vivos trust is the most sophisticated of these alternatives
to an incompetency proceeding, and provides the greatest flexibility.
The settlor may create a trust naming himself as trustee, with provi-
sion for a successor trustee upon his incapacity. The settlor can also
create a trust with another person or institution as trustee, and still
retain complete power to direct the trustee until the settlor becomes
incompetent.5r6 However, the inter vivos trust does have limitations as
a mechanism for planning for incapacity. Most people do not possess an
estate of sufficient value to warrant the creation of a trust. Moreover,
people are often reluctant to turn over all or a portion of their prop-
erty to someone else while they are still personally able to exercise
effective control over it.
5
7
III. SEcTiON 77 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW: AN ANALYSIS
A. General Policy Considerations
The White House Conference on Aging made these recommenda-
tions concerning the rights of the elderly:
Older persons should be encouraged and enabled to be an inte-
gral and non-segregated part of the family and community life accord-
ing to their desires. Their responsibility for independent decision
making, retirement planning, choosing living arrangements and their
continued independence in the management of their affairs should
be zealously safeguarded. When physically or mentally unable to do
so, they have the right to receive personal, social, and legal protec-
tion from the family and the community.58
This policy statement comports with the underlying social value that
adults should be entitled to make their own decisions, even if such
decisions are unwise. Everyone should have the right to make foolish
53. Id. at 182-83.
54. Id. at 183. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001-2209.
55. Zillgitt, supra note 49, at 183.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 183-84.
58. WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING, supra note 16, at 226-27.
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expenditures. However, where older people with declining physical
and mental capacity are involved, there is a conflicting paternalistic
social value tending to impose restrictions upon people whom society
feels should receive protection.
The New York incompetency provisions evidence this sentiment.
The law preserves from waste or destruction the property of the per-
son whom it declares to be incompetent. 9 There is an implicit assump-
tion in this statute that the declared incompetent would squander his
estate if given the opportunity. Diminution of the estate is considered
inappropriate because: (1) if the person recovers he will need the
money for support; and (2) it is thought that the estate should be kept
intact to provide for dependents, and upon the death of the incompe-
tent, to provide for his heirs.60
Opposing these considerations is the argument that the court
should not intervene because a proceeding that divests a person of
his property rights has a potential for abuse. Many guardianships are
instituted by anxious expectant heirs who disapprove of the nature of
a relative's expenditures. 61 Statutes providing for the appointment of
fiduciaries are "dangerous . .. easily capable of abuse by designing
relatives to accomplish the very wrong intended to be guarded against,
and therefore to be administered by the courts with utmost caution
and conservatism." 62 These same policy considerations underlie the
conservator law.
The conservator law should not encounter constitutional criti-
cism, The jurisdiction of a court to intervene in business affairs to pre-
vent incompetents from squandering their estates has been repeatedly
upheld. In Sporza v. German Savings Bank6" Judge Haight of the New
York Court of Appeals stated:
Jurisdiction is inherent in the state over unfortunate persons within
its limits who are idiots or have been deprived of the use of their mental
faculties. It is its duty to protect the community from the acts of those
persons who are not under the guidance of reason, and also to pro-
tect them, their persons and property from their own disordered and
insane acts.64
59. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 78.01 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
60. Lewin, supra note 37, at 69.
61. ALEXANDER 71.
62. In re Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 357, 359, 58 A. 665, 666 (1904).
63. 192 N.Y. 8, 84N.E. 406 (1908).
64. Id. at 14, 84 N.E. at 408.
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Conservator laws similar to New York's new statute also have success-
fully resisted challenge on constitutional grounds. The Illinois Su-
preme Court, in Loss v. Loss,65 upheld the constitutionality of an Illi-
nois statute66 providing for conservators for persons unable to protect
themselves or their property. The court found that the statute does
not deprive one of property rights because it becomes operative only
when a person is incapable of exercising his rights. In a later case, In
re Estate of Stevenson,67 the same court decided that the standard of
inability to manage one's estate is sufficiently clear so as not to be un-
constitutionally vague or indefinite.
B. Practical Effect of the Statute
The basic impact of the new statute lies in the broadening of the
categories of persons for whom a fiduciary may be appointed. The defi-
nition of the class of individuals for whom a surrogate manager may be
appointed is no longer restricted to those legally incompetent.
The conservator statute must deal with several problems that
every statute providing for the appointment of a fiduciary must face.
Initially, the court must decide when a person has reached the status
where there is a need for assistance. This issue is perhaps best de-
termined by a test phrased in terms of managerial ability, with final
determination to be made by a jury.68 The New York statute utilizes
this test.69 A further issue arises concerning the burden of proof which
must be sustained. Under the New York statute, the factfinder must be
satisfied that there exists "clear and convincing" proof of the need for a
surrogate manager.70 It could be argued, of course, that because of the
deprivation of rights over property, and because of the probable stigma
that will be associated with the adjudication, the standard of proof
should be that of "beyond a reasonable doubt."71
Another problem that a statute providing for the appointment of
65. 25 Ill. App. 2d 515, 185 N.E.2d 228 (1962).
66. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 3, § 112-13 (1961).
67. 44 Ill. App. 2d 525, 256 N.E.2d 766 (1970); see In re Guardianship of
Schmidt, 221 Ore. 535, 352 P.2d 152 (1960).
68. The California Conservator Law has no provision for jury trial; however, its
courts have decided that the subject of the conservatorship proceeding can demand a
jury determination. Le Jeune v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 696, 32 Cal. Rptr.
390 (1963).
69. N.Y. MENTAL HYGmNE LAW §§ 77.01, 77.07(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
70. This statutory standard of proof is in accord with judicial decision. See In re
Myer's Estate, 395 Pa. 459, 150 A.2d 525 (1959).
71. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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a surrogate manager must face is assuring that the appointed fiduciary
performs in the best interests of the conservatee. The new law has two
provisions, not included in the incompetency law, that are designed
to ensure this result. The conservatee, subject to court discretion, has
the option of selecting his own conservator.7 2 The effect of this provision
is to increase the likelihood that the outlook of the person selected is
compatible with that of the ward. Additionally, the court is given sub-
stantial flexibility in determining what powers should be granted to
the fiduciary.73 It is submitted that instead of granting a total transfer
of powers, the court should discriminate and grant only those powers
necessary to compensate for the ward's particular impairment. A useful
approach in determining how much of a transfer is necessary would be
to select the least restrictive alternatives. A least-restrictive-alternative
analysis is required before a first amendment right may be limited by
court decision.74 This approach could be applied to the incompetency
proceeding. Furthermore, it would be in the conservatee's interests to
require the surrogate manager to periodically contact his ward to as-
certain his needs and to determine whether progress toward recovery
has been made. This is particularly important when lawyers or banks
are appointed as fiduciaries, since such conservators frequently neither
know the ward nor visit him.
In analyzing the law, several possible areas of internal inconsistency
are revealed. Section 77.25 (b) states that "[a]ppointment of a con-
servator shall not be evidence of the competency or incompetency of
the conservatee." However, § 77.25 (c) provides that certain "contracts,
conveyances, or dispositions" shall be voidable at the option of the
conservator. It seems that the conservatee is thereby relegated to the
status of a de facto incompetent. Such a relegation would seem to be
contrary to the general policy of § 77.25 (b). Furthermore, though the
conservatee is protected by the objective of preventing him from
squandering his estate, appointment of a conservator does not inter-
fere with his power to dispose of property by will.7 He can choose to
72. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 77.03(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
73. Id. § 77.19.
74. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964); Shelton v,
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). For a discussion of the least restrictive means test
when a compelling state interest is shown, see Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153,
1160 n.3 (4th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion). The policy of least restrictive alternative
is utilized in the involuntary admission section of the Mental Hygiene Law. N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 31.27(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
75. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 77.25(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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whom his property will devolve, but he cannot transfer the property
for his own benefit. A possible explanation of this paradox may appear
in light of the discussion below which suggests that the real beneficiary
of the appointment need not be the ward.
7 6
Recovery is always at least a remote possibility for debilitated per-
sons. The incompetency law does not provide specific guidelines for
legal 'restoration of competency status. Since separate statutory provi-
sions are lacking, the courts have followed common law procedure.7 7
The conservator law is an improvement over the incompetency law in
that express restoration guidelines are included.78 But their value in
practice is questionable in light of the requirement revealed in the field
study by George Alexander and Travis Lewin: though general allega-
tions of incompetency are sufficient in incompetency proceedings, spe-
cific proof is necessary before a court will restore a person to compe-
tency.70 There is little reason to believe that the courts will not apply
the new law in a similar manner. Further, though there is a provision
for the discharge of the conservator if the conservatee recovers, there is
no incentive built into the law to change the status quo. There should
be some requirement of periodic review so that in those cases where
recovery in fact occurs, restoration will follow. In reality, because con-
servators are usually sought in cases of advancing age, there is usually
little reason to expect that the ward will recover his mental powers. The
parties who are motivated to initiate conservatorship proceedings are
usually expectant heirs or creditors. There is thus an obvious conflict
of interest between the self-interested fiduciary and the ward. 0 This
is particularly true if the value of the estate is significant. The law
should recognize that the beneficiaries may be self-interested; even
though they couch their position in terms of benefit to the ward. Alex-
ander and Lewin have suggested that the legislature should identify
legitimate interests of special classes of beneficiaries in the ward's prop-
erty as an alternative to depriving the ward of complete control of his
property by way of conservatorship or incompetency proceedings.81 "A
76. See text at notes 80-82 infra.
77. In re Abrams, 25 Misc. 2d 610, 199 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
78. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 77.35 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
79. ALEXANDER 24.
80. See In re Guardianship of Malnick, 180 Neb. 748, 145 N.W.2d 339 (1966);
In re Estate of Washam, 364 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1961); Olson v. Olson, 242 Iowa 192, 46
N.W.2d 1 (1951); Denner v. Beyer, 352 Pa. 386, 42 A.2d 747 (1945); In re Lamont's
Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P.2d 649 (1938).
81. ALEXANDER 4.
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better procedure would be to attempt legislatively to identify legiti-
mate interests of others and to protect them expressly in law rather
than to protect them circuitously through incompetency proceedings."82
An important element of this proposal would be the recognition of
legitimate interests. For example, a wife would have an interest in the
property of her spendthrift husband, while distant relatives, who might
otherwise expect to be heirs, could not interfere in an attempt to con-
serve the property for themselves.
CONCLUSION
The New York Conservator Law is an affirmative step toward the
protection of the elderly. However, the effect of the statute is still
that an individual is stigmatized and deprived of property rights. One
of the lessons that should be evident from study of the incompetency
law is that better safeguards are needed. At this point it is difficult to
determine if the courts will apply the new law any differently from the
incompetency law. They should observe extreme caution to ensure
that any loss by the conservatee of such a basic right of citizenship
as control over property is necessary and in fact in his best interests.
When a first amendment right is limited by court decision a least-dras-
tic-means test must be applied.83 A similar test should be used to re-
quire that the least restrictive alternative is selected when the indi-
vidual is deprived of the power to manage his property.
SHELDON REPP
82. Id.
83. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
